This paper discusses the interrelationship between business regulations and entrepreneurial activities.
Introduction

1
High quality institutions are fundamental for firms and individuals making good decisions.
The decision to become an entrepreneur is no exception. One aspect, which is of interest for both incumbent firms and potential entrants, is regulations associated with starting and running a business. Many business regulations are necessary for securing a safe and wellfunctioning market. In other cases, the benefits of upholding these regulations are more questionable if the costs of complying with these regulations to the benefits are considered.
What are the costs for the society associated with too extensive business regulation? The potential welfare loss in the society occurs at three levels. Firstly, the government has to bear costs associated with creating, upholding and controlling business regulations. Secondly, there are direct compliance costs for incumbent firms, which need to spend resources on, for example, administration. Djankov et. al (2002) try to measure and compare the official requirements in terms of time and cost spent for starting a business across 85 countries. For the case of Sweden 6 procedures, 13 days and a cost of $641 are required. Finally, there are indirect costs associated with business regulation and red tape. Resources spent on complying with business regulations may have alternative and more efficient uses.
Alternative and more efficient uses may, for example, investments or innovative activities.
Among the indirect costs, we also have to consider that extensive business regulations may inhibit potential entrepreneurs from starting their business. This indirect cost associated with business regulation and in particular, the effect on entrepreneurship is the focus in this paper.
During recent decades developed countries has undergone a fundamental shift from what Audretsch and Thurik (2000) denote the "managed economy" towards the "entrepreneurial 3 economy". In brief, large firms creating the bulk of new job opportunities characterized the managed economy. Large-scale production and wage competition characterized the competitive environment. On contrary, the development towards an entrepreneurial economy, spurred by innovation in information technology, is characterized by knowledgeintensive competition. In entrepreneurial economy, it is claimed that the bulk of new jobs are created in small and new businesses. These changes have not gone unnoticed by policymakers. Alongside this development, we can observe a policy shift away from business regulation and antitrust policies towards policies aiming at stimulation the diffusion and commercialization of new knowledge (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000) . Furthermore, there has been increased interest in the importance of the conditions for running and starting a business. In particular, the administrative burden, sometimes referred to as "red tape", associated with running a business has received increasing interest. In the OECD the administrative burden for businesses are estimated to correspond to on average three per cent of total GDP (OECD 2001) . Hence, lowering these costs has a potentially substantial effect on growth. In the European Union, the aim is to decrease the administrative burden by 25 per cent by 2012. This paper aims to provide an overview of the empirical literature on the effect of business regulation and red tape on entrepreneurial activities. Furthermore, it is argued that policymakers are sensitive to responding to the transformation from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy. Hence, they react to the emerging entrepreneurial economy by improving the conditions for entrepreneurship by means of changing the regulatory environment and trying to decrease business regulation and cut red tape.
The paper is organised as follows: Section two provides an attempt to define what we mean with business regulation and red tape. Furthermore, theoretical arguments for a interrelationship between the level of business regulation and entrepreneurial activities are put forward. Section three provides a summary of previous empirical findings on business regulation and entrepreneurial activities. Section four provides a description of the data used 4 in the empirical analysis. In section five, the empirical results are presented. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for future research are presented.
Business regulation and red tape and the interrelation with entrepreneurship policy
Regulation is a concept that is imprecisely defined in the literature. Hence, some authors deliberately prefer to use a quite vague definition of regulations (see e.g. Hägg, 1998 (Bozeman, 2000 p.82) Hence, red tape by definition is regarded as something bad, which does not contribute to the fulfillment of the regulation. However, as noted by Kaufman (1977) it is important to remember that something that is regarded as red tape for one individual, firm or organization might not be regarded as red tape for others. Regarding red tape Bozeman (2000) argues that there are two main reasons for why they occur. Firstly, they can be "red tape" already from the beginning i.e. they are created by policymakers or in processes that fail to have an overall perspective. Hence, they are badly adjusted to the society already from the beginning. Secondly, regulations turn into red tape when they are worn out with time, for instance, when new regulations are added to already existing regulations. Hence, they might be incompatible with each other.
It is often assumed that there is a tendency of over regulation in the society (Helm, 2006) .
Why do regulations and in particular red tape occur? Economic theory provides us with a number of explanations. One reason for this assumption is that there are certain incentive structures in the society that tend to create too extensive regulation.
Public interest theory, which originates in the writings of Pigou (1938) , explains how regulations can be motivated. The existence of natural monopolies, negative externalities or information asymmetries will result in market failures, which may be corrected by market interventions. Hence, regulations can improve the efficiency and welfare in a society. In the entrepreneurial economy an explicit example would be to implement regulations that make sure that firms producing goods or services with unfavorable environmental or dangerous effects will not be started (Djankov et.al. 2002) . However, public interest theory came to be criticized since they in many cases turned out to be less efficient than was expected.
Furthermore, theoretical arguments were proposed which rendered new solutions to the existence of market failures. According to Coase (1960) negative externalities can be compensated by those who benefit from the externality. Hence, there is no need of government regulation. However, this conclusion is conditional on property rights being well defined.
Special interest theory criticizes the public interest theory based on the observation that it does not consider the political process and interests (see e.g. Tullock, 1967; Stigler, 1971 and Peltzman (1976) . According to Stigler (1971) , incumbent firms have more incentives and more information than, for example, consumers. Hence, special interest groups have more incentives and more possibilities exercise pressure in order to try to decrease competition and increase profitability. According to the "tollbooth" theory it can even be argued that some regulations emerge in order to benefit policymakers and bureaucrats (see e.g. De Soto, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) . In exchange of implementation of certain regulation policymakers expect to gain votes. Applying this strand of literature to regulatory reform regarding business regulations implies that we can expect a dynamic response to the change toward an entrepreneurial economy from policymakers and bureaucrats. Since each additional entrepreneur represent one vote the there might be political gains from improve the conditions for entrepreneurship. In summary, there is a complex interrelationship taking place in the regulatory process between the actions taken by rent-seeking entrepreneurs, vote seeking policy makers and bureaucrats (Lee, 1991) . The empirical part of this paper will test if we can find a positive relationship between the level of entrepreneurship and business regulation.
Red tape, regulation and entrepreneurial activities-a survey of previous studies
This section provides an overview of empirical studies on the relationship between regulation and entrepreneurial activities. Table 1 provides an overview of the content and main results of the empirical studies reviewed in this section.
Van Stel, Storey and Thurik (2006) use data from the World Bank and study the relationship between business regulations and nascent and young entrepreneurship using the Global 
Bjornskov and Foss (2008)
Cross-country study 29 
Data and method
The empirical part of this paper will use data on self-employment from the COMPENDIA database and a measure of the quality of regulation obtained from The Economic freedom of the world index (EFW). These measures are described below.
Self-employment rate from the COMPENDIA database
Entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept, which makes it particularly difficult to measure. Self-employment rates, new firm formation or entrepreneurship indices from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) are frequently used measures in the empirical literature. In this paper, we use self-employment as a measure of entrepreneurship. It should be emphasized that this is not the ideal measure. This measure does cover the aspect that deciding to be self-employed involves risk-taking. However, self-employment is a static measure compared to, for example, the new firm formation (Wennekers et al. 2002) .
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that self-employment is a "natural" choice in many occupations such as, for example agriculture and hence reflect the prevailing industrial structure in a country. Nevertheless, self-employment can be considered to be a wellestablished proxy for entrepreneurial activity (see e.g., Blau 1987; Storey 1991; van Stel 2005) . For our purposes, the main advantage of the self-employment measure is that this measure is available for many countries over a long period.
The self-employment rates in the empirical analysis are harmonized self-employment rates for OECD countries obtained from the COMPENDIA database. 7 The reason for using harmonized self-employment rates is that non-harmonized OECD statistics on selfemployment are not comparable across countries. This is due to that the inclusion of owners/managers of incorporated businesses and how to treat unpaid family workers in the statistics is not consistent across countries. The harmonized COMPENDIA database includes owners/managers of both unincorporated and incorporated businesses, but excludes unpaid family workers and those that have self-employment as a secondary activity. (van Stel 2005) .
Furthermore, the COMPENDIA database distinguishes between total self-employment rates and self-employment rates excluding agricultural sectors. The inclusion of the agricultural sector may be highly influential for self-employment rates in some countries. Therefore, we perform the analysis with total self-employment rates, as well as with self-employment rates The measure of regulatory quality ranges from zero to ten. Zero corresponds to low regulatory quality and ten corresponds to the best possible regulatory quality. It should be mentioned that the index has additional subcomponents, but these components are not complete for several countries. Furthermore, they were not available during the first years these data were published. Hence, a further decomposition of the measure of regulatory quality would considerably decrease the number of observations. Appendix A provides information about the subcomponents of the index.
Our main hypothesis is that the level of entrepreneurial activity will be related to the regulatory quality. Additionally we expect that the level of economic development may affect the regulatory quality. We control for this by including a GDP per capita measure. The GDP -13 -8 per capita measure comes from the COMPENDIA database. In summary, the dataset is a panel dataset including 23 countries and 16 biennial observations. 8 The GDP measure was adjusted using purchasing power parity as of 1990. Furthermore, the GDP per capita variable is used in logarithmic. form. This transformation will reduce problems with non-normality. 9 The author is very grateful for suggestions on suitable instruments. 
Empirical findings
The econometric model is specified as a fixed effect panel data model with the regulation variable as dependent variable and self-employment rates and GDP per capita as explanatory variables. Three alternative specifications were estimated; no country or year effect, country effects and including both country and year effects. Our focus in the analysis is the third speciation i.e. the specification including both time and country specific effects. However, we choose to report all specifications since they provide indications regarding the robustness of the results. We use either total self-employment rates or self-employment rates excluding agriculture in our regressions. The results are presented in tables 3 and 4. The results presented in table 3 refer to the case when self-employment rates excluding agriculture is used as explanatory variable. All specifications show a statistically significant positive relationship between self-employment and our measure of regulatory quality. Table 4 report the results when using total self-employment rates as explanatory variable. In this case, self-employment rates also are found to be positively related to regulatory quality for all three specifications. The level of economic development is found to positively related to regulatory quality. Comparing the results presented in tables, 3 and 4 indicate that the size of the effect might be larger if we use self-employment rates excluding agriculture as explanatory variable. 
Conclusions and suggestions for future research
This paper has discussed to interrelationship between business regulations and entrepreneurial activities. We conclude that most empirical studies find that a better business regulation and red tape negative increase entrepreneurial activities. We argue that the regulatory quality and amount of business regulation may also be related to the extent of entrepreneurial activities in the society i.e. that there are an interrelationship between the two of them. Hence, policymakers have responded to the transformation from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy by adjusting regulatory conditions for starting and running a business.
In the empirical part of the paper, we test whether a positive relationship exists between the level of entrepreneurship and the level of business regulation. We use self-employment rates as a proxy for entrepreneurship and the subcomponent measuring quality if regulation of business from the Economic freedom of the world. (EFW). Our empirical findings support our hypothesis. Suggestions for future research include applying alternative and more dynamic measures of entrepreneurship such as the GEM index or new firm formation rates.
Furthermore, alternative measures such as, for example, measures from the World Bank on the ease of starting and running a business can be used in order to check the robustness of our results.
